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ABSTRACT: In the scholarly debate about the relationship between the European Court of Human 
Rights and the CJEU, the potential impact of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) 
is often overlooked. Unless the European Court of Human Rights’ equivalent protection doctrine is 
extended to the EEA, the door is open for indirect ECHR review of all the parts of EU law that have 
been made part of the EEA Agreement and as such implemented into the national laws of the par-
ticipating European Free Trade Association (EFTA) States. The impact of CJEU case-law in the EFTA 
pillar of the EEA is such that this will come very close to full (albeit indirect) scrutiny of the CJEU’s 
protection of fundamental rights within the EU’s internal market. An extension of the equivalent 
protection doctrine to EEA law admittedly presupposes a novel approach to the question of 
whether an international treaty establishes a system that offers a level of human rights protection 
equivalent to that of the ECHR, and to the limitation to strict legal obligations established in Bos-
phorus. Nevertheless, we submit that the European Court of Human Rights ought to rethink its ap-
parent opposition to the idea. This will also offer an opportunity to clarify the relationship between 
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the judgments in Matthews and Bosphorus with regard to obligations flowing from international 
treaties to which Member States have freely entered into.  
 
KEYWORDS: European Court of Human Rights – CJEU – EFTA Court – EFTA States – EEA – equivalent 
protection. 
I. Introduction 
In the scholarly debate about the complex and complicated relationship between the 
European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU, the potential impact of the 1992 
Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) is often overlooked. The EEA Agree-
ment is an international agreement between the EU, the EU Member States and three 
of the remaining four Member States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
which for more than 25 years have integrated the latter (Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway) into the better part of the EU’s internal market.1 Its principal objective, in the 
words of both the CJEU and the separate Court of Justice of the EFTA pillar of the EEA 
(EFTA Court),2 is to provide for the fullest possible realisation of the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital within the whole EEA, so that the internal market is 
extended to the participating EFTA States.3 In order to fulfil this objective, more or less 
the entire internal market acquis is incorporated into the Agreement4 and as such sub-
jected to specific rules of interpretation intended to secure uniform application of EU 
and EEA law in “a homogeneous European Economic Area” (Art. 1 EEA).5 As a result of 
this, the well-known need to balance the fundamental freedoms of the internal market 
and the fundamental (human) rights that the CJEU has recognised as general principles 
of EU law is also to be found in the EEA. Furthermore, as the three EEA/EFTA States are 
all parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the potential for con-
flicts between their EEA and ECHR obligations is comparable to the better-known poten-
tial for conflicts between EU Member States obligations under EU and ECHR law. 
 
1 Agreement on the European Economic Area. The fourth remaining EFTA State, Switzerland, remains 
outside the EEA as the result of a referendum held in 1992. Certain sectors of the internal market are kept 
outside the EEA Agreement (agriculture, fisheries, etc.), but that is of no concern for our present purposes. 
2 Established by the participating EFTA States as a substitute for the CJEU, as required by Art. 108 EEA. 
3 See Court of Justice, judgment of 23 September 2003, case C-452/01, Ospelt and Schlössle Weissen-
berg, para. 29, and the EFTA Court’s follow-up in its judgment of 12 December 2003, case E-1/03, EFTA Sur-
veillance Authority v. Iceland, para. 27. This understanding of the Agreement’s objective has been norma-
tive for the interpretation of EEA law ever since, see e.g. the recent confirmation by the Court of Justice, 
judgment of 2 April 2020, case C-897/19 PPU, Ruska Federacija [GC], para. 50. 
4 At the time of writing, more than 12 500 EU legal acts have been incorporated into the EEA Agree-
ment since the signing in 1992. Of these acts, around half are currently in force, see www.efta.int. 
5 For an introduction, see H.H. FREDRIKSEN, C. FRANKLIN, Of Pragmatism and Principles: The EEA Agreement 
20 Years On, in Common Market Law Review, 2015, p. 629 et seq. 
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As far as the EU Member States are concerned, the European Court of Human 
Rights decided in the seminal Bosphorus judgment that they are shielded from full ECHR 
review by the so-called equivalent protection doctrine. Holding that EU law provides 
“equivalent protection” of human rights “as regards both the substantive guarantees 
offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance”,6 the European Court of Hu-
man Rights established a strong presumption of convention compatibility that applies if 
an EU Member State has done nothing more than to implement EU law obligations. The 
presumption is rebutted only if it is demonstrated that the protection of ECHR rights 
was “manifestly deficient” in the circumstances of that particular case.7 Indirectly, but 
hardly inadvertently, this established a pragmatic allocation of tasks between the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and the CJEU that has reduced the potential for judicial 
conflicts between the two courts considerably. 
The question of whether the equivalent protection doctrine extends to the EEA and 
the participating EFTA States, however, remains open.8 There are indeed differences 
between EU law and the law of the EFTA pillar of the EEA that may suggest an answer in 
the negative. However, such a conclusion would leave the door wide open for indirect 
ECHR review of all parts of EU law that have been incorporated into the EEA Agreement 
and as such implemented into the national laws of the participating EFTA States. The 
impact of CJEU case-law in the EFTA pillar of the EEA is such that this would come very 
close to full (albeit indirect) scrutiny of the CJEU’s protection of fundamental rights with-
in the scope of the EU’s internal market. It would also leave the EEA/EFTA States in a dif-
ficult situation in cases where there indeed are tensions between the CJEU’s and the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights’ balancing of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
6 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 30 June 2005, no. 45036/98, Bosphorus Hava Yolları 
Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], para. 155. The doctrine is often referred to as the “Bospho-
rus doctrine”, but we prefer the term “equivalent protection doctrine” as it predates the Bosphorus judg-
ment. The roots of the equivalent protection doctrine at least go back to European Commission of Hu-
man Rights, decision of 9 February 1990, no. 13258/87, M & Co v. Germany. 
7 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 156 et seq. 
8 There is some, but not much literature on this. See, in the English language: C. BAUDENBACHER, Funda-
mental Rights in EEA Law or: How Far from Bosphorus Is the European Economic Area Agreement?, in S. 
BREITENMOSER, B. EHRENZELLER, M. SASSOLI, W. STOFFEL, B. W. PFEIFER (eds), Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule 
of Law: Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber, Baden-Baden: Nomos , 2007, p. 59 et seq. (suggesting that Bosphorus 
could be extended to cover the EEA/EFTA system); D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, Fundamental Rights in EEA Law, in The 
EFTA Court (ed.), The EEA and the EFTA Court – Decentered Integration, Oxford: Hart, 2014, p. 271 et seq. (reject-
ing analogous application of Bosphorus). An early contribution in the Norwegian language is H.H. FREDRIKSEN, 
K.E. SKODVIN, Den europeiske menneskerettighetsdomstolens kontroll med vern av grunnleggende rettigheter i EF, 
EU og EØS, in Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 2006, p. 566 et seq. (scepticism towards the Bosphorus doctrine as 
such carried over to the question of its applicability to the EEA/EFTA System, but partially for reasons that 
have later been remedied – such as the EFTA Court’s subsequent recognition of fundamental rights as un-
written general principles of EEA law, see section IV.1 below). 
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In its recent judgment in the case of Konkurrenten.no v. Norway, the European Court 
of Human Rights suggested in passing (obiter dictum) that the equivalent protection doc-
trine does not apply to the EEA Agreement.9 This inherent differentiation between EU 
and EEA law parts with the approach of the CJEU, which has come to considers the 
EEA/EFTA States to be “on the same footing as Member States of the European Union”10 
and their citizens to be in a situation “objectively comparable with that of an EU citizen 
to whom, in accordance with Art. 3, para. 2, TEU, the Union offers an area of freedom, 
security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is 
ensured”.11 
In this Article, we will first sketch out the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law 
on the interaction between the ECHR regime and international organisations (section II) 
and then present the Konkurrenten.no case (section III). The main part of our contribu-
tion is a critical review of the European Court of Human Rights’ reasons for the suggest-
ed non-application of the equivalent protection doctrine to the EEA/EFTA system (sec-
tion IV), followed by an analysis of whether other characteristics of the EEA nevertheless 
compel the same result (section V). We identify the delimitation of the equivalent pro-
tection doctrine towards international legal obligations “freely entered into”, as estab-
lished in Matthews and apparently upheld in Bosphorus, as the main challenge to an ex-
tension of the doctrine to the EEA. We nevertheless argue that the raison d’être of the 
equivalent protection doctrine suggests that obligations flowing from judicial evolution 
of (implicitly) open-ended treaty commitments ought to be covered by the equivalent pro-
tection doctrine, and on this basis that the doctrine can be extended to the EEA/EFTA 
system. In the final section, we submit that the European Court of Human Rights ought 
to reconsider the obiter dictum in Konkurrenten.no when ruling upon the pending case 
LO and NTF v. Norway.12 
In the following, we use the term “EEA/EFTA system” to refer to the substantive and 
procedural system established by the EEA Agreement and the closely related Agree-
ment between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a 
Court of Justice (EEA/EFTA Surveillance and Court Agreement – SCA).13 The European 
Union and its Member States are also parties to the EEA Agreement, but not to the 
 
9 European Court of Human Rights, decision of 5 November 2019, no. 47341/15, Konkurrenten.no AS 
v. Norway, para. 45.  
10 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 December 2015, case C-81/13, United Kingdom v. Council [GC], pa-
ra. 59 (differentiating the EEA Agreement from the EEC‑Turkey Association Agreement).  
11 Ruska Federacija [GC], cit., para. 58. 
12 European Court of Human Rights, no. 45487/17, Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and 
Norwegian Transport Workers’ Union (NTF) v. Norway (communicated 30 April 2019).  
13 Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court 
of Justice of 2 May 1992 (hereafter: SCA). For the consolidated Agreement with all its protocols and an-
nexes, see www.efta.int.  
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SCA.14 For the purposes of this Article, it is the situation for the EEA/EFTA States vis-à-vis 
the ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights that is of interest. The EEA Agree-
ment forms an integral part of the Union legal system and is as such to be applied by 
the EU Member States in conformity with the fundamental rights guaranteed by prima-
ry EU law.15 It follows from this that the application of EEA law in the EU Member States 
is already covered by the Bosphorus presumption of ECHR conformity.16 
The scope of the contribution is limited to whether the equivalent protection doc-
trine, as it currently applies to the EU Member States, ought to be extended to the EFTA 
States in the EEA. We will not enter into the debate about the continued justification of 
the Bosphorus presumption in a situation where the road to EU accession to the ECHR 
has become much longer than originally anticipated, and where the CJEU has arguably 
become more interested in the EU’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights than in the 
ECHR. From the perspective of the EEA/EFTA States, the main concern is equal treat-
ment with the EU Member States, not so much the exact level of scrutiny to which the 
European Court of Human Rights subjects them all. If the European Court of Human 
Rights instead took the step of abolishing the equivalent protection doctrine altogether, 
rather than extending it to the EEA, we would thus not object. 
II. Attribution of conduct and the European Court of Human 
Rights case-law on international organisations 
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a voluminous case-law on the in-
teraction between the ECHR regime and international organisations. We do not need to 
reiterate all the twists and turns of this case-law here.17 Nevertheless, one fundamental 
distinction is crucial for properly understanding the equivalent protection doctrine and 
its (potential) applicability to the EEA/EFTA system. That is the distinction between con-
duct attributed solely to an international organisation (IO-attributed conduct) and con-
duct attributed solely or partially to a Member State implementing a decision of an in-
ternational organisation (MS-attributed conduct).18 
 
14 As EU Member States’ fulfilment of their EEA law obligations is monitored by the European Com-
mission and adjudicated upon by the CJEU, in accordance with the general rules of the TFEU, see (implicit-
ly) Art. 108 EEA and (explicitly, as far as the Commission is concerned) Art. 109 EEA.  
15 In the hierarchy of EU norms, international agreements rank above legal acts enacted by the EU 
institutions, but below the Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the general principles that 
together constitute so-called primary EU law. 
16 Despite the general wording of the obiter dictum in Konkurrenten.no AS v. Norway, cit., it thus seems 
safe to assume that the European Court of Human Rights had only the EFTA pillar of the EEA in mind. 
17 For a recent study of this case-law, see E. RAVASI, Human Rights Protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ, 
Leiden: Brill, Nijhoff, 2017, p. 19 et seq. 
18 We are far from the first to emphasise this distinction. See e.g.: T. LOCK, Beyond Bosphorus: The Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on the Responsibility of Member States of International Organisations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, in Human Rights Law Review, 2010, p. 529 et seq.; C. 
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As we will explain in this section, the starting point when assessing the responsibil-
ity of a Member State for these two forms of conduct differs. MS-attributed conduct 
should engage the responsibility of that Member State, while IO-attributed conduct 
should not generally engage the responsibility of its Member States. The European 
Court of Human Rights nominally applies the equivalent protection doctrine to both MS-
attributed conduct and IO-attributed conduct. However, despite the use of identical 
terminology to these two different forms of conduct, the European Court of Human 
Rights’ standard of review differs sharply depending on the form of conduct – thus rec-
ognising the fundamental differences between them. 
ii.1. European Court of Human Rights review of MS-attributed conduct 
The Bosphorus case is a stereotypical example of MS-attributed conduct: Irish officials 
seized a Bosphorus Airways’ plane in order to implement Council Regulation 990/93 re-
garding sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As the European Court of 
Human Rights confirmed, the conduct of Irish officials is attributable to Ireland, even when 
they are merely implementing an obligation under the law of an international organisation 
Ireland is a member of – in casu the EU.19 Given this, the point of departure is that such MS-
attributed conduct engages that Member State’s responsibility, if it violates the ECHR.  
What the European Court of Human Rights did in Bosphorus was to carve out an ex-
ception to the Member State’s responsibility, on the basis that EU law provides “equiva-
lent protection” of human rights “as regards both the substantive guarantees offered 
and the mechanisms controlling their observance”.20 For the EU and other international 
organisations providing “equivalent protection”, a strong presumption of Convention 
compatibility applies if the State has done nothing more than implementing legal obli-
gations flowing from its membership of the organisation. To rebut this presumption, it 
must be demonstrated that the protection of ECHR rights was “manifestly deficient” in 
the circumstances of a particular case.21 
 
RYNGAERT, Oscillating Between Embracing and Avoiding Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights on 
Member State Responsibility for Acts of International Organisations and the Case of the European Union, in 
European Law Review, 2014, p. 176 et seq.; E. RAVASI, Human Rights Protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ, cit., p. 
19 et seq. 
19 When acting outside the strict legal obligations flowing from their membership in the organisation, 
Member States are fully responsible for their conduct, see e.g. Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret 
Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 157; European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 21 January 
2011, no. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], para. 338. 
20 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 155. 
21 Ibid., para. 156. 
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ii.2. European Court of Human Rights Review of IO-attributed Conduct 
In situations of IO-attributed conduct, no relevant acts or omissions are attributable to the 
organisation’s Member States. From the perspective of international law, an international 
organisation is a subject of law separate from its Member States. The organisation’s rights 
and duties are separate from those of its members. Consequently, IO-attributed conduct 
does not engage the responsibility of the organisation’s Member States. 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, does not leave states completely 
off the hook when they transfer powers to an international organisation. The act of en-
tering into the constituent instrument of the organisation is attributable to the Member 
States, and so far the European Court of Human Rights has identified two situations 
where responsibility may arise on this basis: 
a) If the constituent instrument itself directly violates a substantive ECHR right (Mat-
thews).22 
b) If the organisation is established with structural weaknesses in its system of pro-
cedural guarantees rendering it manifestly deficient compared to the ECHR system 
(Gasparini).23 
In Matthews the applicant successfully argued before the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Grand Chamber that the provisions of the EU Treaties providing for direct elec-
tions to the European Parliament violated his right to vote under Art. 3 of Protocol no. 1 
to the ECHR. According to the treaties as they stood at the time, the residents of Gibral-
tar (a dependent territory of the UK) were precluded from voting in the European Par-
liament elections – even though Union law applied there.24 The European Court of Hu-
man Rights came to the rather blunt conclusion that the relevant parts of the EU Trea-
ties were “freely entered into by the United Kingdom”, and consequently that it, “to-
gether with all the other parties to the Maastricht Treaty”, was responsible for “the con-
sequences of” the EU Treaties.25 
The Matthews situation is, in other words, not really an example of IO-attributed 
conduct, as it may appear to be at first glance, but of MS-attributed conduct. As the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights correctly concludes, the constituent treaties of interna-
 
22 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 18 February 1999, no. 24833/94, Matthews v. United 
Kingdom [GC]. 
23 European Court of Human Rights, decision of 12 May 2009, no. 10750/03, Gasparini v. Italy and Bel-
gium. 
24 Matthews v. United Kingdom [GC], cit., para. 33. 
25 Ibid., para. 33. The violation of Protocol no. 1, Art. 3 ECHR flowed from the Act Concerning the Elec-
tion of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage of 20 September 
1976, which the European Court of Human Rights considered to “a treaty within the Community legal or-
der”, together with the extension to the European Parliament’s competences brought about by the Maas-
tricht Treaty. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the UK (but not the other EU Member 
States) could also have been held responsible for its implementation of its treaty obligation not to extend 
the right to vote to the Gibraltarians. 
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tional organisations are not acts of the organisations, but rather “common acts of the 
Member States”, for which the parties to the ECHR are fully liable.26 The act of entering 
into a treaty is a free choice, and thus an MS-attributed act. Even if the conduct directly 
causing the violation may be IO-attributed, it is directly mandated by a treaty provision, 
which is a form of MS-attributed conduct. 
Such violations, which are directly caused by a treaty obligation (Matthews – MS-
attributed conduct), must be distinguished from violations that result from the subse-
quent exercise by the organisation alone of its powers (Gasparini – IO-attributed conduct). 
International organisations have a legal personality separate from that of their Member 
States, and consequently some degree of autonomy. For Member States, international 
organisations may represent a so-called “Frankenstein problem”: When an organisation 
is created, it attains a life of its own and cannot be fully controlled – at least not by indi-
vidual states.27 If the European Court of Human Rights were to hold the Member States 
fully responsible for the IO-attributed conduct, thus piercing the institutional veil, the 
“Frankenstein problem” would become acute. As a response, the Member States would 
keep the organisation under even closer control, which in turn would hinder interna-
tional cooperation.28 The underlying rationale differs from that which applies to MS-
attributed conduct,29 and suggests that the standard of review must be lenient if IO-
attributed conduct is susceptible to European Court of Human Rights review. 
The European Court of Human Rights’ approach to this issue in Gasparini and sub-
sequent case-law is well in line with these considerations. In Gasparini, a NATO staff 
member alleged that proceedings before the NATO Appeals Board did not meet the re-
quirements of fair trial under Art. 6 ECHR. An organ of NATO, the Appeals Board was in 
practice the final arbiter in disputes between NATO and its staff, due to the organisa-
tion’s jurisdictional immunity. Since NATO is not party to the EHCR, the applicant filed 
the case against Belgium (NATO’s host country) and Italy (his state of nationality), argu-
ing that they should have ensured that NATO’s dispute resolution mechanisms suffi-
ciently protected the right to a fair trial when the organisation was created. 
 
26 E. RAVASI, Human Rights Protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ, cit., p. 35. 
27 A. GUZMAN, International Organizations and the Frankenstein Problem, in European Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 2013, p. 1000. 
28 M. HARTWIG, International Organizations or Institutions, Responsibility and Liability, in R WOLFRUM (ed.), 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 
opil.ouplaw.com, para. 32; E. RAVASI, Human Rights Protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ, cit., p. 72. This ra-
tionale also shines through in Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., 
particularly in para. 150.  
29 Whether in the form of acceding to an organization’s constituent instrument (e.g. Matthews v. Unit-
ed Kingdom [GC], cit.) or of implementing obligations established by the secondary law of that organisa-
tion (e.g. Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit.). 
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Rather than dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction ratione personae, as it had 
done in the comparable cases of Boivin and Connolly,30 the European Court of Human 
Rights entertained the applicant’s novel argument in Gasparini. The European Court of 
Human Rights distinguished Boivin and Connolly, since the applicants in those cases only 
challenged specific decisions of the applicable dispute resolution mechanisms, rather 
than a structural deficiency. It then stated, borrowing some phrases from Bosphorus, 
that there was a presumption of EHCR compliance that could be rebutted if the proce-
dural regime was manifestly deficient.31 
Despite the similarity in phrasing, this Gasparini test is more lenient than the Bos-
phorus test. To rebut the Gasparini presumption of equivalent protection, it is not suffi-
cient to demonstrate that there is a manifest deficiency in the human rights protection 
in the particular case – as is possible in cases concerning MS-attributed conduct. Rather, 
the Gasparini test entails that applicants must prove that there are manifest and struc-
tural deficiencies in the system of human rights protection. Moreover, the assessment is 
fixed in time; it is sufficient that when the Member State(s) in question joined the organ-
isation, they did so with the good faith that there were no such manifest and structural 
deficiencies.32 The Gasparini test has therefore been accurately characterised as the 
“light” version of the equivalent protection doctrine – in contrast to the stricter (but still 
not very strict) version that is applicable to MS-attributed conduct.33 
Zooming out, we see that the use of different versions of the equivalent protection 
doctrine for these two situations reflects the variable involvement of the respondent 
Member State. The strict version is applicable where the Member State itself has im-
plemented legal obligations flowing from its membership. The light version is applicable 
where the Member State has merely been involved in setting up the organisation, and 
not taken part in the conduct causing the alleged violation at hand. 
III. The European Court of Human Rights’ first stab at the EEA: 
Konkurrenten.no v. Norway  
In the recent case of Konkurrenten.no v. Norway, a chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights addressed the applicability of the equivalent protection doctrine to the 
EFTA pillar of the EEA for the first time: 
“43. [...] the basis for the presumption established by Bosphorus is in principle lacking 
when it comes to the implementation of EEA law at domestic level within the framework 
 
30 European Court of Human Rights: decision of 9 September 2008, no. 73250/01, Boivin v. 34 Mem-
ber States of the Council of Europe; decision of 9 December 2008, no. 73274/01, Connolly v. 15 Member 
States of the European Union. 
31 Gasparini v. Italy and Belgium, cit. 
32 E. RAVASI, Human Rights Protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ, cit., p. 74. 
33 Ibid., p. 70. 
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of the EEA Agreement, due to the specificities of the governing treaties, compared to 
those of the European Union. For the purpose of the present analysis, two distinct fea-
tures need to be specifically highlighted. Firstly, and in contrast to EU law, there is within 
the framework of the EEA Agreement itself no direct effect and no supremacy (contrast 
[Bosphorus] § 164). Secondly, and although the EFTA Court has expressed the view that 
the provisions of the EEA Agreement ‘are to be interpreted in the light of fundamental 
rights’ in order to enhance coherence between EEA law and EU law (see, inter alia, the 
EFTA Court’s judgment in its case E-28/15 Yankuba Jabbi [2016] para. 81), the EEA Agree-
ment does not include the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, or any reference whatso-
ever to other legal instruments having the same effect, such as the Convention”. 
Importantly, this statement is an obiter dictum, as the case was not about MS-
attributed conduct. Rather, it fell in the category of IO-attributed conduct, and more pre-
cisely the subcategory of alleged violations that result from the exercise by the organisa-
tion alone of its powers (Gasparini). That is because the case concerned the handling of 
the EFTA Court – which is an international organisation of its own34 – of a particular case. 
In short, the complaint in Konkurrenten.no concerned the compatibility of the rules 
on standing in direct actions before the EFTA Court with Art. 6 ECHR. The applicable 
standing rule of the SCA, Art. 36, para. 2, is based on Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU and re-
quires the plaintiff to be either an addressee of the decision of the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority or directly and individually concerned by it. As the EFTA Court has essentially 
adopted the CJEU’s (in)famous Plaumann formula, both the very strict “direct and indi-
vidual concern” test and the question of its compatibility with the principle of effective 
judicial protection will be familiar to EU law lawyers.35 However, there are (as always) 
some twists on the EEA version of the matter. 
In EU law, the strict rules on standing in actions for annulment of EU legal acts are 
compensated for by the possibility to bring an action before a national court, with the 
Foto-Frost doctrine obliging even a first instance court to refer the matter to the CJEU if it 
considers the objections to the validity of the EU legal act in question to be well found-
ed.36 Furthermore, the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon omitted the “individual concern” criteria 
for regulatory acts that do not entail implementing measures.37 In the EEA/EFTA system, 
 
34 Art. 1 of Protocol no. 7 SCA. 
35 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 July 1963, case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission of the EEC, as con-
firmed with regard to its compatibility with the principle of effective judicial protection in Court of Justice, 
judgment of 25 July 2002, case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council. From the EFTA Court, 
see e.g. judgment of 19 June 2003, case E-2/02, Technologien Bau- und Wirtshaftsberatung GmbH and Bello-
na Foundation v. EFTA Surveillance Authority; judgment of 21 February 2008, case E-5/07, Private 
Barnehagers Landsforbund. 
36 As held by the Court of Justice in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, cit., para. 40. See also 
Court of Justice, judgment of 22 October 1987, case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost. 
37 Art. 263, para. 4, third limb, TFEU. See also P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 559-564. 
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however, the prevailing view is that national courts are never obliged to refer a case to 
the EFTA Court, not even in a Foto-Frost scenario.38 Even if a reference is made, the EFTA 
Court can only give an advisory opinion on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement, not 
rule upon the validity of a decision from the EFTA Surveillance Authority (or from the 
EEA Joint Committee).39 Furthermore, the special regime for EU regulatory acts has no 
parallel in the EEA/EFTA system.40 
Thus, it is indeed possible to argue that the EFTA Court’s adoption of the Plaumann 
formula may, in certain cases, leave certain individuals without adequate judicial pro-
tection against decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority. However, the merits of this 
argument depend on the national court’s ability to remedy the problem.41 
As to the case brought before the European Court of Human Rights by the Norwegian 
bus transportation company Konkurrenten.no, however, this mattered little. Before the 
EFTA Court, the company had brought actions for annulment against two decisions from 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority that concerned the closing of investigations into alleged 
State aid to a competitor.42 The EFTA Court dismissed both applications due to lacking lo-
cus standi. Such decisions are not regulatory acts within the meaning of Art. 263, para. 4, 
TFEU,43 nor are they acts where the differences concerning the preliminary ruling proce-
dures in Union law and in the EEA/EFTA system appear to be of any relevance.  
True, Konkurrenten.no could not have brought an action against the EFTA Surveil-
lance Authority in Norwegian courts, but neither can such decisions of the European 
Commission be challenged before the national courts of EU Member States. On the 
other hand, the underlying matter of substantive EU/EEA law, whether the competitor 
had indeed been given unlawful State aid by Norway, could have been brought before 
Norwegian courts. But Konkurrenten.no had not done so.44  
The conduct complained about to the European Court of Human Rights – i.e. the 
dismissals of the two actions for annulment – was authored by the EFTA Court alone. 
 
38 See section IV.3 below. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Art. 36 SCA has not been updated to include the third limb of Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU, which was 
added by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon. 
41 Which again may challenge the European Court of Human Rights’ above-mentioned differentiation 
between IO-attributed and MS-attributed conduct, since the ECHR-compatibility of the standing rules be-
fore the EFTA Court and the national courts will be interdependent. This, however, is a matter that will 
not be pursued further in this Article. 
42 EFTA Court, order of 20 March 2015, case E-19/13, Konkurrenten.no v. ESA (one of the two orders 
that gave rise to the complaint to the European Court of Human Rights in the case under discussion). 
43 As noted by the EFTA Court in Konkurrenten.no v. ESA, cit., para. 91. If the decisions had been regulato-
ry acts within the meaning of Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU, the EFTA Court would have had to consider the possibil-
ity, within acknowledged EEA law rules of interpretation, of adopting a more liberal approach to Art. 36, para. 
2, SCA in order to provide for equal access to justice in the EFTA pillar and the EU pillar of the EEA. 
44 Presumably because it is very difficult to substantiate such a claim without the assistance of the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority, with its far reaching investigatory powers, resources, and expertise.  
718 Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen and Stian Øby Johansen 
That said, Konkurrenten.no attempted to argue otherwise, namely that the intervention 
of the Norwegian government in the proceedings before the EFTA Court was a reason 
for attributing the EFTA Court’s dismissal of the case to Norway. However, the European 
Court of Human Rights noted that the EFTA Court is a judicial body, deciding cases in-
dependently and impartially. Should a court ultimately decide a case “more or less 
along the same lines as [a State] argued in [its] submission, that cannot itself trigger the 
responsibility of that State”.45 
Thereafter, without discussing the broader EEA context of the case, the European 
Court of Human Rights applied the Gasparini test to the EFTA Court. The EFTA Court had 
used the CJEU’s Plaumann formula for legal standing, and given adequate (arguably 
even detailed) reasons for why Konkurrenten.no, as “only” a competitor of the recipient 
of the alleged State aid, did not pass the test. The European Court of Human Rights 
found that this did not constitute a structural shortcoming in the procedural regime of 
the EFTA Court – as required to trigger member state responsibility for IO-attributed 
conduct.46 This confirmation of the ECHR conformity of the Plaumann formula in the 
EEA setting will not please everyone, but given the applicable test (Gasparini) it can 
hardly be considered surprising. 
IV. The equivalent protection doctrine and its (in-)applicability to 
the EEA/EFTA system 
In the obiter dictum in Konkurrenten.no, the European Court of Human Rights asserts 
that the equivalent protection doctrine is inapplicable to the EFTA pillar of the EEA be-
cause EEA law does not provide a level of fundamental rights protection “equivalent” to 
that of the ECHR system. The Court offers two arguments to support this view: the lack 
of EEA law principles of direct effect and supremacy, and the lack of a textual basis for 
the recognition of fundamental rights as part of EEA law. 
As we will explain in sub-sections IV.1 and IV.2 below, we are of the opinion that nei-
ther of these arguments justify the finding that the EEA law of the EFTA pillar does not 
provide equivalent protection to that of the ECHR. On the other hand, as we will 
demonstrate in sections IV.3 and IV.4, there are other differences between EU and EEA 
law that might perhaps justify the conclusion drawn by the European Court of Human 
Rights. Most notable among them are the differences between the EU and the EEA/EFTA 
versions of the preliminary ruling procedure and the fact that all decisions of the EEA 
Joint Committee require the consent of all three EEA/EFTA States. 
 
45 Konkurrenten.no AS v. Norway, cit., para. 41. 
46 Ibid., paras 42-48.  
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iv.1. The EEA Agreement’s lack of a written catalogue of fundamental 
rights 
As mentioned in section II above, the equivalent protection doctrine consists of two 
limbs: the equivalence of the substantive guarantees offered and the equivalence of the 
mechanisms controlling their observance.47 The European Court of Human Rights’ re-
mark in Konkurrenten.no concerning the lack of an EEA equivalent to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, “or any reference whatsoever to other legal instruments having 
the same effect”, relates to the first of these: Are the substantive fundamental rights 
guarantees offered by the EEA Agreement equivalent to those of the ECHR? 
If one looks at the text of the EEA Agreement, the European Court of Human Rights 
is certainly right that an EEA catalogue of fundamental rights is nowhere to be found. 
Nor are there references to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ECHR or other hu-
man rights instruments. Indeed, the only relevant reference in the main part of the EEA 
Agreement is the contracting parties’ intention, expressed in the very first recital of the 
preamble, that the European Economic Area will contribute “to the construction of a Eu-
rope based on peace, democracy and human rights”. This hardly compares to the pre-
sent state of EU law, where the Charter of Fundamental Rights is given the same legal 
value as the Treaties (Art. 6, para. 1, TEU) and fundamental rights, “as guaranteed by the 
[ECHR] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States”, are recognised as general principles of EU law (Art. 6, para. 3, TEU).  
However, if one compares the EEA Agreement with the state of EU law in 2005, 
when Bosphorus was decided, the contrast is much less stark. While the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights was solemnly proclaimed by the EU’s Parliament, Council and Commis-
sion on 7 December 2000, it remained a soft law instrument until the 2007 Treaty of 
Lisbon made it part of primary EU law. In Bosphorus, the European Court of Human 
Rights took note of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, but stressed that it was not le-
gally binding.48 Thus, unless the obiter dictum in Konkurrenten.no is meant to raise the 
bar for application of the equivalent protection doctrine, the lack of an EEA equivalent 
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights cannot be decisive. 
As to the ECHR, it is true that today’s Art. 6, para. 3, TEU was introduced into the EU 
Treaties already by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (as Art. F of the Treaty on the Europe-
an Union).49 Still, as noted by the European Court of Human Rights itself in Bosphorus, 
this was no more than a reflection of the case-law of the CJEU, which at that time had 
long recognised fundamental rights as general principles of Community law and high-
 
47 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 155. 
48 Ibid., para. 159.  
49 Treaty on European Union (adopted 2 July 1992, in force 1 November 1993). 
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lighted the special significance of the ECHR as a source of inspiration.50 The reasoning 
in Bosphorus hardly suggests that the codification of the case-law of the CJEU was par-
ticularly important – not to mention decisive – to the assessment of the substantive 
guarantees of fundamental rights offered by EU law in 2005. 
If one attempts to compare the approach to fundamental rights in the CJEU case-
law prior to the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights with that of the 
EFTA Court today, the similarities outweigh the differences. It is true that the EFTA Court 
occasionally “only” states that provisions of the EEA Agreement “are to be interpreted in 
the light of fundamental rights”, as it indeed did in the Jabbi case that the European 
Court of Human Rights chose to cite in Konkurrenten.no. On other occasions, however, 
the EFTA Court has made quite clear that fundamental rights are recognised as unwrit-
ten general principles of EEA law. One example is provided by Posten Norge, in which the 
EFTA Court noted that “[t]he principle of effective judicial protection including the right 
to a fair trial, which is inter alia enshrined in Art. 6 ECHR, is a general principle of EEA 
law”.51 Another more generally phrased example is the case of Olsen from 2014, where 
the EFTA Court was confronted with the question of whether the imposition of a partic-
ular Norwegian wealth tax was contrary to the requirement to respect “the fundamen-
tal rights guaranteed under the EEA Agreement”.52 The Norwegian government argued 
that the scope of fundamental rights was irrelevant to the case as the wealth tax in 
question fell outside the scope of the EEA Agreement. The EFTA Court replied that: 
“In essence, the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the EEA Agreement 
are applicable in all situations governed by EEA law. The Court [...] must provide all the 
guidance as to interpretation needed in order for the national court to determine 
whether that legislation is compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of 
which the Court ensures. [...] 
Where it is apparent that national legislation is such as to obstruct the exercise of one or 
more fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EEA Agreement, it may benefit from the 
exceptions provided for by EEA law in order to justify that fact only insofar as that com-
plies with the fundamental rights enforced by the Court. That obligation to comply with 
fundamental rights manifestly comes within the scope of EEA law [...]”.53 
 
50 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 159, cf. para. 73 et 
seq. 
51 EFTA Court, judgment of 18 April 2012, case E-15/10, Posten Norge AS v. EFTA Surveillance Authority, 
para. 86. 
52 EFTA Court, advisory opinion of 9 July 2014, joined cases E-3/13 and E-20/13, Fred. Olsen and Others 
and Petter Olsen and Others and The Norwegian State, represented by the Central Tax Office for Large Enter-
prises and the Directorate of Taxes, para. 224. 
53 Ibid., paras 225 and 227. 
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In the 2016 case of Holship, the EFTA Court summed this up in one short sentence: 
“Fundamental rights form part of the unwritten principles of EEA law”.54 
Moreover, the EFTA Court has long highlighted that all of the EEA States (the three 
EEA/EFTA States and all of the EU Member States) are parties to the ECHR, and constant-
ly held that the provisions of the ECHR and the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights are important sources for determining the scope of the fundamental 
rights of EEA law.55 As a result, there is by now consensus in EEA literature that provi-
sions of the EEA Agreement are to be interpreted and applied in a manner that is con-
sistent with the EEA States’ obligations under the ECHR.56 The situation is less clear 
when it comes to fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
that go beyond those found in the ECHR.57 However, that is a matter of no relevance to 
the question of whether the EEA/EFTA system provides substantive fundamental rights 
guarantees equivalent to those of the ECHR system.58 
If any difference is to be found in the ECHR-equivalence of the substantive funda-
mental rights that form part of EEA and EU law, it is that the EFTA Court has remained 
more ECHR-centred than the CJEU. After the entry into force of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, the CJEU appears to have turned its attention towards the EU’s own 
Charter and lost some of its previous interest in the ECHR.59 Whether the EFTA Court 
will side with the CJEU or the European Court of Human Rights in a case of divergences 
in the case-law between the latter two, remains open. A qualified guess is that it will try 
to mitigate the conflict and search for the middle ground. The point advanced here, 
however, is that this cannot impact upon the European Court of Human Rights’ assess-
ment of the ECHR-equivalence of the substantive fundamental rights guarantees of-
fered by the EEA Agreement as long as the European Court of Human Rights maintains 
that the EU meets this test.  
 
54 EFTA Court, advisory opinion of 19 April 2016, case E-14/15, Holship Norge AS and Norsk Trans-
portarbeiderforbund, para. 123. 
55 Including in EFTA Court, advisory opinion of 26 July 2016, case E-28/15, Yankuba Jabbi and The Nor-
wegian Government, represented by the Immigration Appeals Board, to which the European Court of Human 
Rights referred in Konkurrenten.no AS v. Norway, cit. 
56 For an analysis, see D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, Fundamental Rights in EEA Law, cit., p. 263 et seq. See also R. 
SPANO, The EFTA Court and Fundamental Rights, in European Constitutional Law Review, p. 476 et seq. 
57 See, e.g., H.H. FREDRIKSEN, C. FRANKLIN, Of Pragmatism and Principles, cit., p. 647 et seq.; R. SPANO, The 
EFTA Court and Fundamental Rights, cit., p. 479 et seq. 
58 It may be added here that the European Court of Human Rights’ remarks on the lack of a written 
EEA catalogue of human rights was “acknowledged” in the opinion of AG Tanchev delivered on 27 Febru-
ary 2020, case C-897/19 PPU, Ruska Federacija, para. 113, but then essentially brushed aside with reason-
ing that takes for granted that EEA law prohibits extradition to conditions of inhuman or degrading 
treatment in the same way as Art. 3 ECHR and Art. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, see para. 114 
et seq. The CJEU itself did not comment on this in the judgment in the case. 
59 See, in particular, G. DE BÚRCA, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Hu-
man Rights Adjudicator?, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2013, p. 168 et seq. 
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Thus, assuming that an obiter dictum in an ordinary chamber judgment is not meant 
to raise the bar for what constitutes equivalent (substantive) protection, as this concept 
was fleshed out in Bosphorus, the emphasis put on the EEA Agreement’s lack of a writ-
ten catalogue of fundamental rights appears misguided.60  
iv.2. The lack of EEA law principles of direct effect and supremacy 
The second of the European Court of Human Rights’ two arguments for not extending 
the equivalent protection doctrine to the EEA/EFTA system is that “in contrast to EU law, 
there is within the framework of the EEA Agreement itself no direct effect and no su-
premacy (contrast [Bosphorus] § 164)”.61 As the pinpoint reference indicates, supremacy 
and direct effect was indeed mentioned in Bosphorus. However, in Konkurrenten.no the 
European Court of Human Rights appears to have put far more emphasis on these two 
doctrines than the Bosphorus precedent suggests. 
a) Supremacy and direct effect in Bosphorus. 
In Bosphorus, supremacy and direct effect are mentioned in connection with the 
question of whether the EU offers a level of human rights protection equivalent to that 
of the ECHR system in procedural terms.62 As the European Court of Human Rights put 
it, “the effectiveness of [the] substantive guarantees of fundamental rights depends on 
the mechanisms of control in place to ensure their observance”.63 
An obvious argument against procedural equivalency between the ECHR system 
and the EU system was (and still is) the limited direct access to the CJEU for individuals. 
An individual can only institute review proceedings before the CJEU against an act of in-
stitutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union addressed to that person or which is 
of direct and individual concern to them, and these conditions are interpreted and ap-
plied strictly by the CJEU (the above-mentioned Plaumann formula).64 As is well known, 
there is no individual complaint procedure to the CJEU resembling that of Art. 34 ECHR. 
Compared with the rules on standing before the European Court of Human Rights, one 
can thus hardly say that direct actions before the CJEU provide an equivalent level of 
protection. The question for the European Court of Human Rights in Bosphorus was 
 
60 This finding does not alter the fact that the EEA/EFTA States in our opinion ought to implement the 
EEA-relevant parts of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the EEA legal framework, either in the EEA 
Agreement as such (with the consent of the EU) or, alternatively, in the SCA. Such formal recognition of 
the Charter will strengthen the legitimacy of the fundamental rights case-law of the EFTA Court and pre-
vent misunderstandings as to the status of fundamental rights within EEA law. 
61 Konkurrenten.no AS v. Norway, cit., para. 43. 
62 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., paras 160-165. 
63 Ibid., cit., para. 160. 
64 Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU; Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., 
para. 162. 
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therefore whether other aspects of the EU system of judicial protection compensated 
for the lack of direct access to the CJEU. 
Key here is the EU system of preliminary references from national courts to the 
CJEU. The European Court of Human Rights began its analysis by outlining the relation-
ship between the CJEU and domestic courts, and it is in this context that supremacy and 
direct effect are mentioned in passing: 
“it is essentially through the national courts that the Community system provides a rem-
edy to individuals against a member State or another individual for a breach of Commu-
nity law [...]. It was the development by the ECJ of important notions such as the suprem-
acy of Community law, direct effect, indirect effect and State liability [...] which greatly en-
larged the role of the domestic courts in the enforcement of Community law and its fun-
damental rights guarantees”.65 
As we can see, supremacy and direct effect are mentioned as part of an array of Un-
ion law doctrines. However, there is nothing in the quotation that suggests that su-
premacy and direct effect have a particular prominence when assessing equivalency. 
Moreover, when read in context, the above-quoted subparagraph appears to be a mere 
introduction to the European Court of Human Rights’ main point: 
“The ECJ maintains its control on the application by national courts of [Union] law, includ-
ing its fundamental rights guarantees, through the procedure for which [Art. 267 TFEU] 
provides. While the ECJ’s role is limited to replying to the interpretative or validity ques-
tion referred by the domestic court, the reply will often be determinative of the domestic 
proceedings (as, indeed, it was in the present case [...]) and detailed guidelines on the 
timing and content of a preliminary reference have been laid down by the [TFEU] and 
developed by the ECJ in its case-law. The parties to the domestic proceedings have the 
right to put their case to the ECJ during the [Art. 267 TFEU] process. It is further noted 
that national courts operate in legal systems into which the Convention has been incor-
porated, albeit to differing degrees”.66 
Immediately thereafter, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that “[i]n 
such circumstances, the Court finds that the protection of fundamental rights by [Un-
ion] law can be considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, ‘equivalent’ [...] 
to that of the Convention system”.67 
Although the European Court of Human Rights is not explicit with regard to the rel-
ative importance of the different factors it mentions in this part of Bosphorus, its focus 
appears to be on the CJEU and its relationship with – and control over – domestic 
courts. Taken as a whole, the European Court of Human Rights’ reasoning reads as a 
 
65 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 164, subpara. 1 
(emphasis added). 
66 Ibid., para. 164, subpara. 2. 
67 Ibid., para. 165. 
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justification for why the CJEU is in control of the application of Union law in the Member 
States, and consequently able to review it against the EU catalogue of fundamental 
rights (which is substantively equivalent to that of the ECHR). 
In this light, the brief references to the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect in 
Bosphorus come across as ancillary factors. The European Court of Human Rights ap-
pears to see them as tools for the CJEU’s enforcement of EU fundamental rights vis-à-vis 
domestic courts, thus contributing towards a procedurally equivalent level of protec-
tion. 
b) Does the lack of supremacy and direct effect of EEA law lessen the protection of 
fundamental rights? 
Given the importance that the European Court of Human Rights seems to attach to 
the lack of EEA law principles of direct effect and supremacy in Konkurrenten.no, it is 
pertinent to ask whether supremacy and direct effect actually contribute towards pro-
tection of fundamental rights in the context of EU law. And, if so, when and how? 
In order to answer these questions, it is paramount to distinguish between the di-
rect effect and supremacy of the fundamental rights recognised as part of EU law, on 
the one hand, and the direct effect and supremacy of EU law obligations that allegedly 
interfere with ECHR rights and freedoms, on the other. Bosphorus itself belongs in the 
latter category, as the conduct of Irish authorities and courts were governed by the di-
rect effect (or rather, according to the wording of Art. 288, para. 2, TFEU, direct applica-
bility) and supremacy of Council Regulation 990/93 regarding sanctions against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To Bosphorus Airways, the effect that EU law gives to 
e.g. regulations hardly improved the company’s effective judicial protection against the 
alleged violations of the right to property. Quite the contrary. 
Thus, the fact that the EFTA Court has made clear that the decisions of the EEA Joint 
Committee are not directly effective at the national level qua EEA law,68 simply cannot 
matter for EU/EEA obligations that allegedly interfere with ECHR rights and freedoms. If 
an alleged ECHR-interfering EEA law obligation has not been implemented into the na-
tional legal system of the dualist EEA/EFTA States (now only Iceland and Norway), its 
harmful effect will simply not be effective in the national courts and the question of its 
compatibility with the ECHR will not materialise.69 
In this connection, it should be emphasised that EEA law’s lack of direct effect does 
not imply that the EEA/EFTA States can exercise any more discretion in implementing 
their EEA obligations than EU Member States have in implementing their Union law ob-
 
68 See, e.g., EFTA Court, judgment of 28 January 2015, case E-15/14, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Ice-
land, para. 32. 
69 It may be added that non-implemented EEA rules can produce indirect effects in the dualist 
EEA/EFTA States, e.g. due to the EEA law principle of conform interpretation and/or domestic law doc-
trines of EEA-conform interpretation of national law. However, it is difficult to see how this can be rele-
vant to the question of the applicability of the equivalent protection doctrine to the EEA. 
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ligations. This is an important point, because the equivalent protection doctrine is only 
applicable to MS-attributed conduct mandated by a strict legal obligation.70 A Member 
State remains fully responsible for conduct falling outside the scope of its legal obliga-
tions, including where the rules allow for discretion.71 The M.S.S. case exemplifies this 
well: Belgium argued that they were obliged under the so-called Dublin II Regulation72 
to return an asylum seeker to Greece – the asylum seeker’s first state of entry.73 How-
ever, as the European Court of Human Rights correctly pointed out, that regulation con-
tains a general exception granting each Member State the competence to examine an 
application for asylum, despite not being the first state of entry.74 Belgium was thus 
able to exercise discretion under the rules, and consequently could not invoke the 
equivalent protection doctrine.75 
Within the scope of the EEA Agreement, EU and EEA Member States have the same 
substantive legal obligations. The difference between the two systems is simply that EU 
Member States are required to ensure that implementation happens automatically in 
some instances, through the domestic application of the doctrine of direct effect, while 
EEA/EFTA states are not. The difference thus merely relates to the choice of means of 
domestic implementation of the obligation, and not its binding nature as a matter of 
international law. Consequently, there is no difference between EU and EEA law when it 
comes to assessing the fulfilment of the strict legal obligation prerequisite for applying 
the equivalent protection doctrine to MS-attributed conduct. 
Turning to the direct effect of the fundamental rights themselves, the lack of an EEA 
equivalent to the EU law principle of direct effect may at first sight seem to be a very re-
al problem. In the context of EU law, the direct effect of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the general principles of EU law guarantees that national courts can defend 
fundamental rights in all situations where national authorities act within the scope of 
EU law, if need be with the assistance of a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.76 
However, the effect of the general principles of EEA law in the national legal orders 
of the dualist EEA/EFTA States was settled long ago by a pragmatic proposition by the 
 
70 See e.g. Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 157; M.S.S. 
v. Belgium and Greece [GC], cit., para. 338. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Regulation (EC) 343/2003 of the Council of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mecha-
nisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of 
the Member States by a third country national. Now Art. 17, para. 1, of Regulation (EU) 604/2013 of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for deter-
mining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (Dublin III Regulation). 
73 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], cit. 
74 Ibid., para. 339. 
75 Ibid., para. 340. 
76 See e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2013, case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson [GC]. 
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EFTA Court in the seminal Sveinbjörnsdóttir case on the principle of State liability for vio-
lations of EEA obligations. Knowing that both of the remaining dualist EEA/EFTA States, 
Iceland and Norway, have given the main part of the EEA Agreement the status of statu-
tory law, the EFTA Court stated that the unwritten principle of State liability had to be 
seen as “an integral part of the EEA Agreement as such” and that it was therefore “natu-
ral to interpret national legislation implementing the main part of the Agreement as al-
so comprising the principle of State liability”.77 This somewhat bold proposition as to 
the interpretation of the EEA Acts of Iceland and Norway was accepted by the Icelandic 
as well as the Norwegian Supreme Court, respectively.78 There is no compelling reason 
why this should not extend to other generally accepted unwritten principles of EEA law, 
including fundamental rights. 
As far as fundamental rights equalling those of the ECHR are concerned, it may be 
added that all of the EEA/EFTA States have incorporated the Convention into their na-
tional legal orders. It would simply make no sense for them or their national courts to 
refuse to recognise such common EEA/ECHR fundamental rights as part of the EEA 
Agreement as implemented into national law. Tellingly, the Supreme Court of Norway 
didn’t even contemplate this matter when it held, in the Holship case of 2016, that 
“[f]undamental rights under EU and EEA law include, inter alia, the ECHR and other fun-
damental international human rights”.79 The Supreme Court simply considered it self-
explanatory that the fundamental rights recognised as part of EEA law are fully effective 
in the Norwegian legal order. 
Turning to the question of supremacy, it is true that the EEA Agreement only knows of 
a watered-down version of this EU law principle. According to Protocol no. 35 of the 
Agreement, the EFTA States have undertaken to introduce, if necessary, a statutory provi-
sion to the effect that EEA rules prevail in cases of possible conflicts between implement-
ed EEA rules and other statutory provisions.80 The limitation to “implemented” EEA rules 
follows from the above-mentioned lack of direct effect, but has – as demonstrated above 
– no practical interest as far as fundamental rights are concerned, as they are indeed im-
plemented into Icelandic and Norwegian law as an integral part of the main part of the 
 
77 EFTA Court, advisory opinion of 10 December 1998, case E-9/97, Erla María Sveinbjörnsdóttir v. the 
Government of Iceland, para. 63. 
78 Icelandic Supreme Court, judgment of 16 December 1999, case 236/1999, Sveinbjörnsdottir; Nor-
wegian Supreme Court, judgment of 28 October 2005, case HR-2005-1690-P, Finanger II. 
79 Norwegian Supreme Court, judgment of 16 December 2016, case HR-2016-2554-P, Holship, para. 
111. An English translation of the judgment is available from the Norwegian Supreme Court’s webpage: 
www.domstol.no. This case has been brought before the European Court of Human Rights, where it is 
pending as Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and Norwegian Transport Workers’ Union (NTF) v. 
Norway, cit. See also sections V.2 and VI below. 
80 For an introduction, see M.K.F. DYSTLAND, I. SØREBØ, F.B. FINSTAD, Article 7 [Binding Effect and Imple-
mentation of EU Legal Acts], in F. ARNESEN, H.H. FREDRIKSEN, H.P. GRAVER, O. MESTAD, C. VEDDER (eds), Agreement 
on the European Economic Area: A Commentary, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, p. 262. 
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EEA Agreement. The same holds true for the fact that the obligation under Protocol no. 35 
itself has to be implemented into the national legal orders of the dualist EEA/EFTA States, 
since both Iceland and Norway have done just that.81 For the purposes of the equivalent 
protection doctrine, there are thus “only” two relevant differences between the EU law 
principle of supremacy and the EEA law obligation to ensure the primacy of implemented 
EEA rules: that the latter do not demand primacy in case of a conflict with constitutional 
law, and that its implementation by way of a provision of domestic (statutory) law cannot 
guarantee against new legislation setting the primacy provision aside.  
Whilst certainly relevant to the comparison of the protection of fundamental rights 
under EU and EEA law as a matter of principle, we dare suggest that the practical effect 
of these differences is very limited. Firstly, after more than 25 years, there are no ex-
amples of any of the EEA/EFTA States invoking their constitutions as a shield against EEA 
fundamental rights or enacting new legislation to the same effect. Moreover, the theo-
retical possibility such situations should at most negate the application of the equiva-
lent protection doctrine in those (theoretical) cases where there is an alleged conflict 
between the ECHR and a EEA/EFTA State’s constitution. In other words, these fringe 
cases could be EEA/EFTA examples where the “manifest deficiency” exception to the 
equivalent protection doctrine is applicable. Finally, it is not clear whether EU law really 
offers much better protection in a scenario where an EU Member State should wish to 
limit the effect of EU fundamental rights in such ways.82 
iv.3. Other EEA/EFTA peculiarities that might justify non-application of 
the equivalent protection doctrine 
So far we have argued that neither the lack of a written fundamental rights catalogue 
nor the lack of direct effect and supremacy disprove that the EFTA pillar of the EEA of-
fers a level of human rights protection equivalent to that of the ECHR system. However, 
there are at least three other differences between the EU and EEA/EFTA systems which 
must be included in the equivalent (procedural) protection assessment. The first is the 
lack of an obligation for apex courts to refer cases to the EFTA Court. The second is the 
non-binding nature of the EFTA Court’s answers to questions of interpretation put to it 
by the national courts. The third is the EFTA Court’s lack of jurisdiction to review deci-
sions of the EEA Joint Committee. 
a) No obligation for apex courts to refer cases to the EFTA Court. 
 
81 Section 2 of the Norwegian EEA Act (Law no. 109/1992) and Section 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act (Law 
no. 2/1993). 
82 For a recent example of a domestic apex court limiting the effect of Union law, albeit in the name 
of (domestic) human rights provisions, see the German Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 5 May 
2020, 2 BvR 859/15, Weiss/PSPP. 
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The CJEU’s control over the application of EU law in domestic courts, in lieu of direct 
access, appear to be central to the European Court of Human Rights’ assessment of 
procedural equivalent protection in Bosphorus.83 It follows from Art. 267, para. 3, TFEU 
that when questions of Union law are raised before an apex court of an EU Member 
State – i.e. “a court or tribunal [...] against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law” – the court in question “shall” refer the question to the CJEU. While 
this obligation has been moderated somewhat by the CILFIT doctrine (acte clair and acte 
éclairé), it remains that apex courts are obliged to refer a question of Union law to the 
CJEU, unless the answer to it is “so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable 
doubt”.84 In Bosphorus, the European Court of Human Rights explained the CILFIT doc-
trine in the introductory part of the judgment, and referred back to that explanation 
when conducting its detailed assessment of whether EU law affords individuals equiva-
lent (procedural) protection.85 
EEA law, on the other hand, contains no obligation for domestic apex courts to refer 
cases to the EFTA Court.86 The EEA Agreement itself does not require the EEA/EFTA 
States to establish a system of preliminary references from national courts to the EFTA 
Court.87 When the EEA/EFTA States nevertheless did just that through Art. 34 SCA, they 
deliberately omitted the third paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU. Whilst it is true that the EFTA 
Court itself has suggested that the general duty of loyal cooperation under Art. 3 EEA 
can oblige the apex courts of the EEA/EFTA States to refer unresolved questions of EEA 
law to it,88 this push has convinced neither the Icelandic nor the Norwegian Supreme 
Court, nor the EFTA Surveillance Authority.89 We need not pursue this controversial 
 
83 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 164; European 
Court of Human Rights, judgment of 23 May 2016, no. 17502/07, Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], para. 104. 
84 Court of Justice: judgment of 6 October 1982, case 283/81, CILFIT v. Ministero della Sanità, paras 12-
16; judgment of 9 September 2015, case C‑160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, para. 38. 
85 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., paras 98 and 164, respec-
tively. 
86 See H.H. FREDRIKSEN, C. FRANKLIN, Of Pragmatism and Principles, cit., pp. 672-673, with further refer-
ences. 
87 Cf. Art. 108, para. 2, EEA, which makes clear that jurisdiction to deal with preliminary references 
from national courts is not among the competences which the Contracting Parties agreed that the EFTA 
Court had to have. See further Art. 107 EEA, which instead opens up for preliminary references to the 
CJEU, but which also makes clear that this is only an option (of which none of the EFTA States, for reasons 
of sovereignty, have availed themselves). 
88 See, e.g., EFTA Court, advisory opinion of 28 September 2012, case E-18/11, Irish Bank, para. 58 et 
seq.; EFTA Court, advisory opinion of 20 March 2013, case E-3/12, Jonsson, para. 60. 
89 The Icelandic Supreme Court has referred only two cases to the EFTA Court over the last five 
years. The Supreme Court of Norway has been more cooperative, with seven referrals in the same peri-
od, but there are several examples of complex matters of EEA law being decided without a reference and 
nothing in the referrals that suggest that the justices feel obliged to send certain types of cases to the 
EFTA Court. Some of the refusals to refer have led to complaints to the EFTA Surveillance Authority – so 
far to no avail. 
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matter further here, as the European Court of Human Rights’ assessment of the proce-
dural protection of fundamental rights in the EFTA pillar of the EEA must clearly be 
based on “facts on the ground”. 
Since the domestic courts of the EEA/EFTA States do not consider themselves 
obliged to refer questions of EEA law, the EFTA Court’s control over them is less firm 
than the control the CJEU exercises over the domestic courts of EU Member States. As a 
consequence, the EFTA Court’s ability to ensure that EEA law is interpreted and applied 
in line with human rights law is weaker than the corresponding ability of the CJEU. 
When reading Bosphorus, it appears that the preliminary ruling procedure is one of 
the key factors, if not the key factor, leading to the finding of equivalent (procedural) 
protection. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has itself stated that in Bos-
phorus it “attached considerable importance to the role and powers of the CJEU”.90 
On the face of it, the EFTA Court’s role and powers are less prominent than those of 
the CJEU. However, cases where there is an alleged conflict between Union law and the 
ECHR may reach the European Court of Human Rights without prior intervention by the 
CJEU. One example is Avotiņš. The applicant had not asked for, nor did the Latvian Su-
preme Court on its own motion request, a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.91 The Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights nevertheless upheld its finding in Bosphorus that Union 
law provides equivalent protection.92 Moreover, after a detailed (yet opaque) discussion 
it concluded that the presumption of equivalent protection could not be rebutted, be-
cause the fundamental rights protection was not manifestly deficient in the circum-
stances of that particular case.93 
In the earlier case of Michaud, however, the presumption of equivalent protection 
was rebutted. In that case, prior CJEU involvement was precluded by the French Conseil 
d’Etat’s refusal to accept the applicant’s request for a preliminary ruling.94 According to 
the European Court of Human Rights, by refusing to entertain a request for preliminary 
ruling even though the CJEU had not had an opportunity to examine the legal issue at 
hand, “the Conseil d’Etat ruled without the full potential of the relevant international 
machinery for supervising fundamental rights – in principle equivalent to that of the 
 
90 Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], cit., para. 104. 
91 Ibid., para. 111. For these reasons, the European Court of Human Rights explicitly distinguished this 
case from judgment of 6 December 2012, no. 12323/11, Michaud v. France, which is discussed just below. 
92 Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], cit., paras 105-112. For more detailed commentary on the case, see S.Ø. 
JOHANSEN, EU Law and the ECHR: The Bosphorus Presumption Is Still Alive and Kicking – the Case of Avotiņš v. 
Latvia, in EU Law Analysis, 24 May 2016, eulawanalysis.blogspot.com. 
93 Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], cit., paras 115-125. 
94 Michaud v. France, cit. 
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Convention – having been deployed”.95 Therefore, there was a manifest deficiency in 
the circumstances of that particular case.96 
By contrast, in Avotiņš, the applicant had not even advanced any specific arguments 
regarding the interpretation of the Union law at issue.97 It thus appears that Avotiņš 
constitutes an example of Union law being (more or less) overlooked in the domestic 
proceedings, while Michaud is an example of a case where the domestic apex court 
wrongly considered that the CILFIT doctrine was applicable. 
As the Michaud and Avotiņš cases illustrate, a formal obligation to refer cases to the 
CJEU is no ironclad guarantee for the actual deployment of the full potential of the Un-
ion’s supervisory mechanism.98 Thus, the European Court of Human Rights will assess, 
in each individual case, whether there are manifest deficiencies in the deployment of 
the Union’s supervisory mechanisms – notably the CJEU. 
If transferred to the EFTA pillar of the EEA, Michaud and Avotiņš suggest that the lack 
of an obligation to refer cases to the EFTA Court need not be decisive after all. Rather, 
Michaud and Avotiņš could be interpreted as suggesting that the equivalent protection 
doctrine will apply if the domestic courts of the EEA/EFTA States have the opportunity to 
submit questions to an international court embedded within a system that provides 
substantially equivalent protection to that of the ECHR. If the full potential of the appli-
cable supervisory mechanisms is not realised in the circumstances of a particular case – 
for example a Michaud-style refusal to refer a case to the EFTA Court – that may consti-
tute a manifest deficiency, so that the presumption of equivalent protection is rebutted. 
If, on the other hand, a case has been referred, and the EFTA Court has thus been given 
the opportunity to assess the fundamental rights invoked by the parties, the fact that 
referrals are voluntary ought not to be decisive.99 
b) Non-binding preliminary rulings from the EFTA Court. 
 
95 Ibid., para. 115. 
96 Ibid. In both Michaud and Avotiņš the European Court of Human Rights’ reasoning is somewhat 
muddled with regard to whether the deployment of “the full potential of the relevant institutional ma-
chinery” is a prerequisite for a general finding of equivalent protection, or whether it forms part of the 
case-by-case assessment of manifest deficiency. We agree with E. RAVASI, Human Rights Protection by the 
ECtHR and the ECJ, cit., p. 116 and pp. 112-123 that the latter understanding is correct. This is also how the 
European Court of Human Rights’ First Section understood the Michaud case in decision of 18 June 2013, 
no. 3890/11, Povse v. Austria, para. 83 – which is in turn was referenced by the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Grand Chamber when setting the stage for its assessment of manifest deficiency in Avotiņš v. Lat-
via [GC], cit., para. 112. 
97 Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], cit., para. 111. 
98 Michaud v. France, cit., para. 115; Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], cit., para. 105. 
99 One such example is the pending European Court of Human Rights case Norwegian Confederation 
of Trade Unions (LO) and Norwegian Transport Workers’ Union (NTF) v. Norway, cit., where the Supreme Court 
of Norway indeed obtained an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court on, e.g., the right to collective bar-
gaining and collective action as a fundamental right under EEA law. 
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Another peculiarity of the EEA/EFTA system when compared to that of the EU is the 
non-binding nature of the EFTA Court’s answers to any question of interpretation put to 
it by a national court. Formally speaking, the EFTA Court’s decisions in cases under Art. 
34 SCA are “advisory opinions”. Admittedly, this has not prevented the EFTA Court from 
styling them as “judgments”100 and considering them part of its case-law on the same 
footing as the binding judicial decisions that other provisions of the SCA vests in the 
court. Still, both the Icelandic and the Norwegian Supreme Court have emphasised that 
the EFTA Court’s opinions on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement are advisory. In 
the Holship case of 2016, the Supreme Court of Norway, sitting in plenary session (Full 
Court), held this to entail that “the courts of the EFTA States must independently con-
sider how to interpret and apply EEA law”.101 
At the same time, however, the Norwegian Supreme Court has emphasised that na-
tional courts shall attach “considerable importance” to the opinions of the EFTA Court. 
Again, the Holship case is instructive: 
“The EFTA states’ courts must [...] normally apply the EFTA Court’s interpretation of EEA 
law, and cannot disregard an advisory opinion by the EFTA Court unless ‘special circum-
stances’ so indicate, cf. Rt. 2013, p. 258, paragraphs 93–94, with reference to the plenary 
judgment of Rt. 2000, pp. 1811-1820. In order for the EFTA Court to fulfil its intended 
purpose, the court’s interpretation of EEA law cannot normally be disregarded unless 
there are weighty and compelling reasons for doing so”.102 
The assessment of the effect in the EEA/EFTA States of the EFTA Court’s advisory 
opinions for the purpose of the applicability of the equivalent protection doctrine is fur-
ther complicated by the intricate relationship between EU and EEA law. Whilst it is true 
that the Supreme Court of Norway has on a few occasions deviated from the interpreta-
tion of EEA law advocated by the EFTA Court, it has only done so in cases where it was 
convinced that CJEU case-law necessitates adjustments of the advice received from the 
EFTA Court.103 This may seem strange to EU and ECHR lawyers unfamiliar with the pecu-
liarities of the EEA, but in essence both the national courts of the EEA/EFTA States and 
 
100 This practice of the EFTA Court began with its very first ruling under Art. 34 SCA: EFTA Court, advi-
sory opinion of 16 December 1996, case E-1/94, Restamark. After some deviations early on, e.g. in Erla 
María Sveinbjörnsdóttir v. the Government of Iceland, cit., it has stuck to styling them as judgments. For re-
cent examples, see e.g. EFTA Court: advisory opinion of 13 May 2020, case E-4/19, Campbell, and advisory 
opinion of 4 February 2020, case E-5/19, Criminal proceedings against F and G. 
101 Norwegian Supreme Court, Holship, cit., para. 76. The Norwegian Supreme Court’s emphasis put 
on the advisory character of the answers received from the EFTA Court goes all the way back to the ple-
nary judgment of 16 November 2000, case HR-2000-49-B, Finanger I. 
102 Norwegian Supreme Court, Holship, cit., para. 77. 
103 See further H.H. FREDRIKSEN, C. FRANKLIN, Of Pragmatism and Principles, cit., p. 674. 
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the EFTA Court itself agrees that the EEA Agreement can only work if common EU/EEA 
law is interpreted and applied in line with CJEU case-law.104 
For our present purposes, we need not go into the controversies that naturally arise 
in cases where the Norwegian Supreme Court believes that it knows the ways of the 
CJEU better than does the EFTA Court. It will rather suffice to note that more than 25 
years after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, no court of an EEA/EFTA State has 
disregarded CJEU case-law in a manner even remotely comparable to the rebellion of 
the German Constitutional Court in Weiss or of the Czech Constitutional Court in Landto-
vá.105 Furthermore, if a national court of an EEA/EFTA State ever was to disregard an ad-
visory opinion received from the EFTA Court without firm support in CJEU case-law, the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority could be expected to initiate an infringement action under 
Art. 31 SCA. Since the EFTA Court has jurisdiction to issue binding judgments in in-
fringement actions, this constitutes an indirect route to a binding decision. 
Thus, if one focuses on the adherence to joint EFTA Court and CJEU case-law by the na-
tional courts rather than the “mere” advisory character of the EFTA Court’s opinions, the 
situation in the EEA/EFTA States is at least comparable and arguably even better than in 
quite a few of the EU Member States. If one interprets Bosphorus to the effect that the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights was concerned with the actual control exercised by the 
CJEU over the fundamental rights protection offered by domestic courts, and not so much 
the formal framework, the lack of binding preliminary rulings from the EFTA Court cannot 
alone be decisive. The European Court of Human Rights could therefore extend the 
equivalent protection doctrine to the EEA/EFTA system and then check carefully if the pro-
cedural protection offered is “manifestly deficient” if there is ever a case where a national 
court has deviated from an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court in a way that appears 
detrimental to the protection of the fundamental rights of the complainant.106 
 
104 The most explicit example from the EFTA Court is the advisory opinion of 8 July 2008, joined cases 
E-9/07 and E-10/07, L’Oréal, para. 28, where, in a remarkably open and straightforward manner, the Court 
held that the objective of a homogeneous EEA “calls for an interpretation of EEA law in line with new case-
law of the [CJEU] regardless of whether the EFTA Court has previously ruled on the question”. 
105 German Federal Constitutional Court, Weiss/PSPP, cit.; J. KOMÁREK, Czech Constitutional Court Playing 
with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires; 
Judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2012, 
p. 323 et seq. 
106 It may be added here that the European Court of Human Rights itself “merely” renders advisory 
opinions in cases where national apex courts refer questions of interpretation to it, see Protocol no. 16 
ECHR. However, the relevance of this to the assessment of the advisory opinions of the EEA/EFTA system 
remains doubtful. On the one hand, it may be argued that the European Court of Human Rights presum-
ably expects its advisory opinions to be adhered to by the referring courts, and that it may therefore also 
acknowledge the advisory opinions of the EEA/EFTA system as not so different from the preliminary rul-
ings of the CJEU. On the other hand, the right under Art. 34 ECHR to bring a complaint before the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights also applies in cases where the national court has obtained an advisory opin-
ion, something which arguably suggests that the parties to the ECHR acknowledge that a system with ad-
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c) The lack of jurisdiction to annul EEA Joint Committee decisions. 
A further challenge to an extension of the equivalent protection doctrine to the 
EEA/EFTA system lies in the fact that the EFTA Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the va-
lidity of decisions from the “EEA legislator” (the EEA Joint Committee).107 In direct ac-
tions, the EFTA Court only has jurisdiction to review the legality of EFTA Surveillance Au-
thority decisions (Art. 36 SCA), whereas its jurisdiction under the preliminary reference 
procedure is limited to questions concerning interpretation of EEA law (Art. 34 SCA).108 
For present purposes, the problem can be illustrated by the infamous Data Reten-
tion Directive, which the CJEU declared invalid in the 2014 Digital Rights Ireland case for 
violating the fundamental right to privacy enshrined in Art. 7 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights.109 At the time of this judgment, the directive was still stuck in the EEA 
Joint Committee due to Icelandic opposition to it, but it was only a matter of time before 
it would have been incorporated into the EEA Agreement. If one imagines e.g. an Ice-
landic version of Digital Rights Ireland, with an Icelandic court referring it to the EFTA 
Court under Art. 34 SCA, the EFTA Court could not have declared the EEA Joint Commit-
tee’s decision to incorporate the directive into the EEA Agreement invalid. 
Upon reflection, however, this difference between EU law and the law of the 
EEA/EFTA system hardly adds much to the already discussed difference between the 
binding preliminary rulings of the CJEU and the advisory opinions of the EFTA Court. An 
advisory opinion could never declare a legal act invalid; it could merely suggest that the 
national court behind the referral should draw this conclusion. If one is prepared to ac-
cept the judicial protection of fundamental rights in the EEA/EFTA system as equivalent 
 
visory opinions to national courts cannot replace a system with direct individual complaints to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. Still, an attempt to apply the latter argument to criticise the protection of 
fundamental rights offered by the EEA/EFTA system would also risk affecting the positive assessment in 
Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., of the preliminary ruling proce-
dure before the CJEU. The fact that the preliminary rulings of the CJEU are binding as to the interpretation 
of relevant EU law does not remove the risk of a national apex court applying it in a way that the losing 
party nevertheless considers to be incompatible with fundamental rights. It may be added that both the 
EU and the EEA/EFTA system offer indirect enforcement by way of possible infringement proceedings 
brought by the EU Commission/the EFTA Surveillance Authority, something which Protocol no. 16 ECHR 
does not (as there is no need for it in light of Art. 34 ECHR). 
107 Novel EU legislation of EEA relevance is constantly incorporated into the EEA Agreement by deci-
sions of the EEA Joint Committee, see Art. 102 EEA. The Joint Committee has the power to adapt the EU 
legal acts to the EEA framework and may also grant requests for substantive adjustments (although the 
EU side rarely agrees to such requests from the EEA/EFTA States). The legal basis for the applicability of 
EU legislation in the EEA is the EEA Joint Committee’s decisions, which justifies the characterisation of the 
Committee as the legislature in the EEA.  
108 Art. 34 SCA has no parallel to Art. 267, para. 1, let. b), TFEU, which gives the CJEU jurisdiction to is-
sue preliminary rulings concerning the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offic-
es or agencies of the Union. 
109 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 April 2014, joined cases C‑293/12 and C‑ 594/12, Digital Rights Ire-
land [GC]. 
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to that offered by the ECHR, despite that fact that the EFTA Court only has jurisdiction to 
render advisory opinion, then the lack of jurisdiction to declare EEA Joint Committee de-
cisions invalid ought not to create additional problems. If the focus is on the overall pro-
tection offered jointly by the EFTA Court and the national courts of the EEA/EFTA States, 
it should suffice that an Icelandic version of Digital Rights Ireland could be solved by the 
EFTA Court recognising an EEA fundamental right to privacy mirroring the one found in 
Art. 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 8 ECHR and holding that the over-
arching objective of homogeneity between EU and EEA law does not allow for the di-
rective to be applicable in the EEA in a situation where it would have to be considered 
invalid and therefore inapplicable in the EU, without there being any need for a formal 
declaration of the EEA Joint Committee decision being null and void.110 
iv.4. Preliminary conclusion on the applicability of the equivalent 
protection doctrine to the EEA 
Based on the analysis above, we are not convinced by the European Court of Human 
Rights’ view that the basis for the presumption established by Bosphorus is lacking in the 
EFTA pillar of the EEA. There are certainly significant differences between EU law and the 
law of EEA/EFTA system: no written catalogue of fundamental rights, no direct effect, no 
obligation to refer, only advisory opinions, no review powers. However, these differences 
do not, in our view, hinder the fact that the overall protection of fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the complex interplay between the EFTA Court, the CJEU and the national courts 
of the EEA/EFTA States, are comparable to the protection offered in the EU, and which the 
European Court of Human Rights found to suffice in Bosphorus. 
An extension of the equivalent protection doctrine to the EEA/EFTA system never-
theless requires that the role of national courts of the EEA/EFTA States are taken into 
consideration to a greater extent than the role of the national courts of the EU Member 
States in Bosphorus itself. To EEA lawyers, familiar with the more “partner-like” relation-
ship between the EFTA Court and the national courts,111 this would seem a natural ad-
aptation of Bosphorus to the characteristics of the EEA. Still, to shield the EEA/EFTA 
States from full ECHR review in cases where the national courts, in the words of the Su-
preme Court of Norway, “must independently consider how to interpret and apply EEA 
law”,112 is undoubtedly quite a stretch of Bosphorus. 
 
110 Another albeit related matter is whether the EFTA Court would in fact have been prepared to “go 
first” in such a scenario and hold the directive to violate fundamental rights, i.e. before the CJEU reached 
this conclusion in Digital Rights Ireland [GC], cit. In hard cases such as Digital Rights Ireland, is the judicial 
protection of fundamental rights in the EEA/EFTA system not only de jure, but also de facto comparable to 
that offered by EU law? For a sceptical view, see H.H. FREDRIKSEN, C. FRANKLIN, Of Pragmatism and Principles, 
cit., pp. 682-683. 
111 As highlighted by the EFTA Court itself in Irish Bank, cit., para. 59.  
112 Norwegian Supreme Court, Holship, cit., para. 76.  
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However, the raison d’être of Bosphorus lies in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
desire to facilitate European integration and to establish a workable relationship with the 
CJEU. In section VI below, we will address this matter and ask if this justifies an extension 
of Bosphorus to the EEA/EFTA system. First, however, we need to address a more funda-
mental question, overlooked by the European Court of Human Rights in Konkurrenten.no, 
but in our opinion the crux of the matter when considering whether to extend the equiva-
lent protection doctrine to the EEA/EFTA system: the European Court of Human Rights’ 
finding in Matthews that a State can never be shielded from ECHR review of its application 
of international obligations which it has “freely entered into”.113 
V. The (in-)applicability of Matthews to the EEA/EFTA system 
In Konkurrenten.no the European Court of Human Rights did not address whether obli-
gations under the EEA Agreement flow from membership of an international organisa-
tion to which the EEA/EFTA States have transferred part of their sovereignty, or whether 
they rather are to be considered obligations “freely entered into” and therefore as such 
exempted from the equivalent protection doctrine.114 
At a glance, there appears to be good reasons to question both whether, by enter-
ing into the EEA agreement, the EEA/EFTA States have become members of an interna-
tional organisation and whether they have delegated sovereign powers to it. As we will 
come back to, the EEA Agreement was drafted specifically to avoid transfer (or, more 
precisely: delegation) of sovereign powers. Moreover, the EEA/EFTA system is not en-
capsulated by an overarching international organisation. 
Before considering this issue further, we need to analyse Matthews and its rationale 
more closely – in particular its far from clear relationship to Bosphorus and the equiva-
lent protection doctrine. This is done in section V.1. We then return to the EEA/EFTA sys-
tem in section V.2. 
v.1. Matthews and its relationship to the equivalent protection 
doctrine 
The relationship between Matthews and the judgment in Bosphorus six years later, is far 
from clear. In Bosphorus, the European Court of Human Rights affirmed Matthews, dis-
tinguishing it along the lines set out in section II above.115 Subsequent case-law has not 
explicitly overruled or limited Matthews, either. The approach in Gasparini was to hold 
Member States responsible for a violation caused by conduct attributable to the organi-
 
113 Matthews v. United Kingdom [GC], cit., para. 33. 
114 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 154; Matthews v. 
United Kingdom [GC], cit., para. 33. 
115 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], cit., para. 157. 
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sation alone, because that organisation was set up with a manifestly deficient system of 
(procedural) human rights protection. The Matthews doctrine therefore appears to hold: 
parties to the ECHR are responsible for violations caused by treaty commitments they 
have “freely entered into”.116 
If taken literally, however, the “freely entered into” approach of Matthews encom-
passes all of the EU Treaties, thus excluding all cases where EU Member States comply 
with obligations flowing directly from them from the scope of the equivalent protection 
doctrine. As the raison d'être of Bosphorus lies in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
desire to facilitate European integration and to establish a workable relationship with 
the CJEU, this begs the question of whether Matthews must nevertheless be considered 
at least partially overruled by Bosphorus.   
In our view, there are valid arguments in favour of handling treaty commitments by 
a State (as in Matthews) differently from binding decisions taken by an international or-
ganisation that is later implemented by its Member States (as in Bosphorus). The act of 
committing to a treaty is a voluntary exercise of state sovereignty. While there may be 
significant political pressure to commit to new treaty obligations, for example when the 
constituent treaties of the European Union are renegotiated, each state is formally free 
to decide for itself. 
In contrast, states that set up international organisations with the power to take le-
gally binding decisions addressed to them as members, are in effect delegating – and 
pooling – their sovereign powers. Those powers are then exercised by the organisation, 
which is endowed with a certain degree of autonomy, as well as a legal personality sep-
arate from that of its Member States. This contrast is less stark for decisions of interna-
tional organisations that are taken by consensus. In the EU system, most legal acts are 
based on competences that provide for majority voting, but some legal bases still re-
quire unanimity.117 Even in areas where majority voting is possible, most decisions by 
the EU Council are nevertheless taken by consensus.118 However, to attribute decisions 
of an organisation to its member states (whether all or just those taken unanimously) is 
tantamount to piercing the organisation’s institutional veil. International law knows no 
such doctrine of veil-piercing; the clear, general rule is that the separate legal personali-
 
116 Matthews v. United Kingdom [GC], cit., para. 33; see also, e.g. European Court of Human Rights, 
judgment of 12 July 2001, no. 42527/98, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], para. 47. Of 
course, this only applies to the treaty commitments that are subsequent to the entry into force of the 
ECHR for the state in question: see European Commission of Human Rights, decision of 28 May 1975, no. 
6231/73, Hess v. UK. 
117 Unanimity is still the rule in over 70 areas post-Lisbon, see P. CRAIG, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, 
and Treaty Reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 43. 
118 For example, in 2019 the EU Council adopted 104 legislative acts using the qualified majority vot-
ing procedure. Only 14 of those acts were adopted with one or more votes against. Abstentions were 
more common, though, with 49 acts adopted with at least one Member State either abstaining or voting 
against. See www.consilium.europa.eu. 
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ty of the organisation cannot be circumvented.119 Tellingly, in Bosphorus the European 
Court of Human Rights did not enquire whether Ireland could have blocked Council 
Regulation 990/93 regarding sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
Joining an international organisation with decision-making powers that also bind 
the member states therefore entails an explicitly open-ended commitment. When a 
state joins the EU, it knows that it operates on the basis of the principle of conferral (like 
all other international organisations) as well as the contours of the competences con-
ferred upon the Union, which are laid down in its constituent treaties. The content of 
secondary Union law cannot be known in advance, however, as it is the result of the po-
litical processes in Brussels. 
As well demonstrated by the EU constituent treaties, however, the view of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights in Matthews that treaty obligations as such are static and 
their consequences therefore foreseeable for a state freely entering into them, does 
not hold. A treaty commitment may in practice entail an implicitly (and partially) open-
ended commitment, because they may contain terms that by design are capable of 
evolving through interpretation.120 The interpretation of vague treaty terms may be par-
ticularly evolutive when an international court has jurisdiction to interpret and apply the 
treaty in question – especially when the court in question favours the object and pur-
pose above the treaty text, as the CJEU is (in)famous for doing. 
The Union’s constituent treaties provide clear examples of this. They establish both 
decision-making institutions and far-reaching substantive treaty obligations. Of sub-
stantive treaty obligations, some are of a more static nature, while others have shown 
themselves highly susceptible to evolutionary interpretation. Joining the EU thus entails: 
1) explicitly open-ended commitments (with regard to secondary law and other 
binding decisions of its institutions – like those at issue in Bosphorus), 
2) more or less static treaty commitments (e.g. the black letter treaty provision on 
elections to the European Parliament – like those at issue in Matthews), and  
3) implicitly open-ended treaty commitments (e.g. the four freedoms, competition 
law, Union citizenship, and much more). 
Commitment type (1) is covered by the equivalent protection doctrine. Commitment 
type (2) appear to be covered by the Matthews doctrine, meaning that member states are 
fully responsible for the consequences flowing from them. However, as of yet there are no 
 
119 Though, in very rare instances a single piece of conduct may be attributed both to the organisa-
tion and (one or more) Member States. Such dual attribution would, however, require a very high degree 
of involvement by the Member State(s) in question that goes far beyond a mere affirmative vote in the 
relevant decision-making body of the organisation. See generally, and with further references, S.Ø. 
JOHANSEN, Dual Attribution of Conduct to Both an International Organisation and a Member State, in Oslo Law 
Review, 2019, p. 178. 
120 E. BJØRGE, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 2 et 
seq. 
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European Court of Human Rights cases concerning commitment type (3): implicitly open-
ended commitments under the constituent treaties of the Union. Nor do we know of any 
cases involving other treaty commitments that are of an implicitly open-ended nature.121 
At present, it is therefore somewhat uncertain how the European Court of Human 
Rights will handle open-ended treaty commitments. On the one hand, the rationale be-
hind Matthews appears to be that states enter into (static) treaty commitments freely, 
and may foresee the consequences of binding themselves to the mast. If it were other-
wise, states could simply circumvent ECHR responsibility by entering into treaties detail-
ing their planned human rights violations. On the other hand, the rationale behind the 
equivalent protection doctrine is the importance of international cooperation and the 
consequent need to secure the proper functioning of international organisations.122 
The rationale that best fits implicitly open-ended treaty commitments is in our view 
the one underlying the equivalent protection doctrine. While it may not be a perfect fit, 
it is certainly more relevant than the rationale underlying Matthews. This suggests that 
the Matthews doctrine should not be applied to implicitly open-ended treaty commit-
ments. Instead, some version of the equivalent protection doctrine should be applied to 
such treaty commitments, which – although “freely entered into” – are developed by in-
ternational courts. 
The distinction between static and (implicitly) open-ended treaty commitments that 
we suggest here may appear vague. An alternative way of distinguishing would be to 
delimit the equivalent protection doctrine in the line with the CJEU’s jurisdiction. It 
would then only be outside the scope of the CJEU’s jurisdiction that the Matthews doc-
trine – full ECHR responsibility for treaty commitments – should apply.123 We are not 
opposed to such an approach, but it does require the European Court of Human Rights 
to explicitly overrule Matthews and thus admit that the distinguishing of that judgment 
in Bosphorus was misguided. That is because the CJEU did indeed have jurisdiction to 
interpret the rules of EU primary law that were at issue in Matthews – although it obvi-
ously could not set them aside.124 Drawing the line where the CJEU has jurisdiction not 
only to interpret, but also to annul, is in our view not recommendable. That is because 
 
121 However, a case of this kind originating in the EEA/EFTA system is presently before the European 
Court of Human Rights: Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and Norwegian Transport Workers’ 
Union (NTF) v. Norway, cit. We will come back to this case in section V.2 below. 
122 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], para. 150, subpara. 2. 
123 As suggested, e.g., by H.H. FREDRIKSEN, K.E. SKODVIN, Den europeiske menneskerettighetsdomstolens 
kontroll med vern av grunnleggende rettigheter i EF, EU og EØS, cit., pp. 552-554. 
124 That the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret these rules is most clearly evidenced by 
judgment of 12 September 2006, case C-145/04, Spain v. UK [GC], where Spain challenged the UK’s at-
tempt at remedying the ECHR violation identified in Matthews v. United Kingdom [GC], cit. 
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such a demarcation would lump all treaty commitments together, whether static or 
open-ended, which we have already demonstrated as being problematic.125 
The distinction we propose preserves both (the core of) Matthews and the equiva-
lent protection case-law, while identifying that there is space for an equivalent protec-
tion-like doctrine for implicitly open-ended treaty commitments. Against this back-
ground, we will now turn to (re)analysing the EEA/EFTA system. 
v.2. Open-ended commitments and the EEA/EFTA system 
The EEA/EFTA system is replete with open-ended treaty commitments. Not only does 
the main part of the EEA Agreement contain commitments of this nature copied from 
the (pre-Maastricht) EEC Treaty. As we will now demonstrate, secondary Union law – no-
tably regulations and directives – make their way over to the EEA/EFTA system in the 
form of treaty commitments. 
For the EU Member States, obligations flowing from secondary Union law are cov-
ered by the equivalent protection doctrine because it is enacted by the organs of the 
Union – an international organisation. Secondary EU law then makes its way into the 
EEA Agreement through decisions of the EEA Joint Committee. But what is the nature of 
the Joint Committee? Is it just the name for a meeting of the parties to the EEA Agree-
ment, or something more – an international organisation? 
While there is some dispute regarding the exact criteria for what constitutes an in-
ternational organisation, one fundamental requirement is that it must have at least one 
organ with a will of its own (volonté distincte).126 This criterion is closely intertwined with 
the notion of international legal personality, which is a reflection of the organisation’s 
volonté distincte.127 This distinguishes organisations from mere treaty bodies, which do 
not have international legal personality. 
The more fine-grained question is thus whether the EEA Joint Committee is (a part 
of) an international organisation, or whether it is a mere treaty body. There is nothing in 
the EEA agreement that suggests that it establishes an organisation with international 
legal personality. As mentioned above, the EEA Agreement was drafted with the specific 
intention of avoiding delegation of sovereign powers to an international organisation. 
This is reflected in the design of the Joint Committee. Its decisions are taken not just 
unanimously, but “by agreement” between the EEA/EFTA states and the Union.128 
Moreover, the Joint Committee does not have a proper secretariat, but one official of 
 
125 Other demarcations of the equivalent protection-like doctrine are also possible, such as e.g. one 
focusing on the binding effect of the CJEU’s case-law interpreting the EU Treaties rather than the treaties 
as such (essentially equating CJEU case-law with secondary EU law elaborating EU primary law).  
126 H.G. SCHERMERS, N.M. BLOKKER, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2018, pp. 48-50, with further references. 
127 Ibid., p. 48. 
128 Art. 93, para. 2, EEA. 
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the EU Commission and one official nominated by the EEA/EFTA States acting jointly as 
secretaries.129 Each side additionally has their own secretariat. The EU side uses the Eu-
ropean External Action Services as their secretariat. The EEA/EFTA states coordinate 
their positions in the so-called Standing Committee of the EFTA States, to which secre-
tariat services are offered by the EFTA organisation. Overall, the Joint Committee lacks 
any semblance of volonté distincte and/or international legal personality. It is thus clearly 
not an international organisation. 
While the Joint Committee is not an international organisation, it may be a part of 
one. A treaty can create a body that forms part of an organisation constituted on the 
basis of a different treaty.130 However, there is no larger “EEA organisation” that the 
Joint Committee is docked with. While the EEA Agreement does not establish any inter-
national organisation, the Surveillance and Court Agreement establishes two: the EFTA 
Surveillance Agency and the EFTA Court.131 But the EEA Joint Committee is not associat-
ed with any of them.132 
Since the Joint Committee is merely a treaty body, its decisions to incorporate EU 
legal acts into the annexes to the EEA Agreement must be regarded as amending trea-
ties. As noted both by the European Commission and the EFTA Court, a decision of the 
EEA Joint Committee constitutes “a simplified form of an international agreement be-
tween the Community and its Member States on the one hand, and the EFTA States par-
ty to the EEA Agreement on the other”.133 
The question is then whether these amending treaties are freely entered into by, on 
the one hand, the EEA/EFTA states, and, on the other, the Union. Since the EEA Joint 
Committee decisions are taken “by agreement” between the parties, at first glance this 
appears to be the case.134 While there is no doubt a high degree of political duress in-
volved, that is of no relevance – the same was likely also the case for the instruments at 
issue in Matthews. 
However, there are some aspects of the EEA Agreement that make the issue less 
clear. First, while there is no legal obligation to accept new EU legislation into the EEA 
 
129 Art. 19 of the Rules of procedure for the EEA Joint Committee. 
130 H.G. SCHERMERS, N.M. BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, cit., p. 304, with further references. 
131 Art. 1 of Protocol no. 6 and Art. 1 of Protocol no. 7 SCA confer legal personality upon, respectively, 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court.  
132 In this connection it should be noted that the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is indeed 
an international organisation, set up by the 1960 EFTA Convention. However, neither the EEA Joint Com-
mittee nor the EFTA Court or the EFTA Surveillance Agency are associated with EFTA as such. The reason 
behind the highly confusing names of the latter two institutions was the expectation that all of the EFTA 
states would become parties to the EEA Agreement, but this was frustrated by the Swiss “No” to the EEA 
in a 1992 referendum on the matter. 
133 EFTA Court, advisory opinion of 9 October 2002, case E-6/01, CIBA Speciality Chemicals Water 
Treatment, para. 33. 
134 Art. 93, para. 2, EEA. 
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Agreement, its object and purpose depend on this being done. Thus, Art. 102, para. 1, EEA 
states that: “In order to guarantee the legal security and the homogeneity of the EEA, the 
EEA Joint Committee shall take a decision concerning an amendment of an Annex to this 
Agreement as closely as possible to the adoption by the Community of the corresponding 
new Community legislation with a view to permitting a simultaneous application of the 
latter as well as of the amendments of the Annexes to the Agreement”.135 
In the 25 years that the EEA Agreement has been in operation, there is still no clear 
example of a “veto” by the EEA/EFTA States against new EU legislation of EEA relevance. 
At best, certain adjustments may be made to adapt e.g. a regulation to the scope and 
context of the EEA Agreement. The EEA Agreement is, in other words, a uniquely dy-
namic treaty – as close to explicitly open-ended that a treaty not establishing an inter-
national organisation can be. 
Second, within the EFTA pillar of the EEA, both the main part of the EEA Agreement 
and the EU legislation included in its annexes are interpreted and applied by independ-
ent bodies: the EFTA Court and the EFTA Surveillance Authority. Not only do they con-
tribute significantly to the dynamism of the EEA Agreement; they are also both interna-
tional organisations – thus further blurring the line between implicitly and explicitly 
open-ended commitments. 
Particularly notable among the implicitly open-ended commitments in the main part 
of the EEA Agreement are the four freedoms, as well as the provisions on competition and 
state aid. These closely mirror their respective twin provisions in the TFEU. While this core 
bundle of EU/EEA law obligations form part of the constituent treaties of the Union and 
the main part of the EEA Agreement – and are in that sense quite “freely entered into” by 
the EU and EEA/EFTA States – they are also stereotypical examples of implicitly open-
ended commitments. Indeed, one of the core characteristics of Union law (and thus, by 
extension, EEA law) is the CJEU’s evolutive and pro-integration interpretations of them.136 
Some have characterised this as a constitutionalisation process – where particularly the 
four freedoms have taken on a (quasi-)constitutional character.137 As pointed out by 
 
135 But “shall” does not imply an obligation on the EEA/EFTA States to agree to the incorporation of 
novel EU legislation into the Agreement, cf. e.g. para. 4 of the same article: “If [...] an agreement on an 
amendment of an Annex to this Agreement cannot be reached, the EEA Joint Committee shall examine all 
further possibilities to maintain the good functioning of this Agreement and take any decision necessary 
to this effect, including the possibility to take notice of the equivalence of legislation”. 
136 See e.g. M.P. MADURO, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Con-
stitution, Oxford: Hart, 1998. 
137 See, in particular, the seminal work of J. H. H. WEILER, The Transformation of Europe, in The Yale Law 
Journal, 1991, p. 2403 et seq., with further references. It is also worth noting that the current president of 
the CJEU has long adopted this constitutionalist narrative, see K. LENAERTS, Constitutionalism and the Many 
Faces of Federalism, in The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1990, p. 205. 
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Stone Sweet, a “potentially explosive problem lurks behind these considerations: Consti-
tutional Courts cannot perform their assigned tasks without making law”.138 
Surprisingly, there has yet to be a European Court of Human Rights case challeng-
ing the human rights compatibility of the four freedoms. A clear candidate for such a 
case presented itself following the CJEU’s infamous ruling in Laval.139 However, the trade 
unions eventually chose to bring their case to the European Committee of Social Rights 
rather than to the European Court of Human Rights.140 
Now, however, the EFTA pillar of the EEA has produced a case of this kind that is cur-
rently pending before the European Court of Human Rights: LO and NTF v. Norway.141 In 
essence, the complainants (the Norwegian Transport Workers' Union and the Norwegian 
Confederation of Trade Unions) argue that the Supreme Court of Norway has violated Art. 
11 ECHR by giving priority to the right to provide services under EEA law in a case where a 
transportation company refused to enter into a collective agreement with provisions on 
preferential right to loading and unloading work for stevedores affiliated with the port of 
call. As the Supreme Court’s judgment closely followed the interpretation of EEA law ad-
vocated by the EFTA Court,142 the complaint is a clear attempt to get the European Court 
of Human Rights to review EFTA Court case-law. Furthermore, since the EFTA Court relied 
heavily on CJEU case-law,143 the complaint is also a clear example of a possible indirect 
European Court of Human Rights review of CJEU case-law. And finally, as the right to pro-
vide services is guaranteed by a provision of the main part of the EEA Agreement (Art. 36 
EEA), mirroring a provision of EU primary law (now Art. 56 TFEU), the case also raises 
questions as to the reach of Matthews and its “freely entered into” test. 
From the reasons developed above in section V.1, we submit that the European 
Court of Human Rights should not apply the Matthews doctrine to the EEA/EFTA system 
when deciding LO and NTF v. Norway. 
VI. A jack-in-the-box in the relationship between the CJEU and the 
European Court of Human Rights? 
Our analysis has demonstrated that an extension of the equivalent protection doctrine to 
the EEA/EFTA system presupposes both a rethinking of the “freely entered into” doctrine 
 
138 A.S. SWEET, The European Court of Justice, in P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 130. 
139 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 December 2007, case C-341/05, Laval Un Partneri Ltd [GC]. 
140 European Committee of Social Rights, decision of 3 July 2013, no. 85/2012, Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) v. Sweden. 
141 Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and Norwegian Transport Workers’ Union (NTF) v. Nor-
way, cit. 
142 Norwegian Supreme Court, Holship, cit., particularly paras 72-78 and 88-99. 
143 EFTA Court, Holship Norge AS and Norsk Transportarbeiderforbund, cit., particularly paras 104-131. 
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established in Matthews and a holistic approach to the question of whether the EEA/EFTA 
system offers a level of human rights protection equivalent to that of the ECHR system. 
Admittedly, it may therefore be argued that the obiter dictum in Konkurrenten.no 
ought to be upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in the pending case of LO 
and NTF v. Norway – albeit for other reasons than those given in the judgment. However, 
as suggested in the very title of this contribution, such a finding would make the 
EEA/EFTA system a proverbial jack-in-the-box in the relationship between the CJEU and 
the European Court of Human Rights. Since both the CJEU and the EFTA Court have con-
firmed on numerous occasions that corresponding provisions of the EU and EEA law are 
to be interpreted uniformly,144 European Court of Human Rights review of the applica-
tion of EEA law in the EEA/EFTA States will come very close to full (albeit indirect) review 
of CJEU case-law. 
Therefore, the arguments in favour of an extension of the equivalent protection 
doctrine to the EFTA States in the EEA include not only appreciation for the international 
cooperation embodied in the EEA Agreement and/or considerations of comity vis-à-vis 
the EFTA Court – but also consideration of the relationship between the European Court 
of Human Rights and the CJEU. 
As explained in the introduction, the CJEU has essentially accepted the law of the 
EEA/EFTA system as equivalent to EU law, holding the EEA/EFTA States to be “on the 
same footing as Member States of the European Union”145 and their citizens to be in a 
situation “objectively comparable with that of an EU citizen to whom, in accordance with 
Art. 3, para. 2, TEU, the Union offers an area of freedom, security and justice without 
internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured”.146 In doing so, 
the CJEU has implicitly recognised as at least comparable the overall protection of fun-
damental rights offered jointly by the EFTA Court and the national courts of the 
EEA/EFTA States. The essence of the question on the application of an equivalent pro-
tection-like doctrine to the EEA/EFTA system is whether the European Court of Human 
Rights is prepared to do the same. 
 
144 The seminal judgment of the Court of Justice is Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg, cit., para. 29. For 
a recent confirmation, see Ruska Federacija [GC], cit. 
145 UK v. Council, cit., para. 59 (differentiating the EEA Agreement from the EEC‑Turkey Association 
Agreement). 
146 Ruska Federacija [GC], cit., para. 58. 
 
